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NOTES
THE LESSONS OF DeSHANEY: SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIPS, SCHOOLS & THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible,
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned
by respondents, who placed him in a dangerous predicament,
and who knew or learned what was going on and yet did
essentially nothing.'
The Court can well imagine all manner of constitutional
mischief which might result from adoption of theories such
as urged by the plaintiff here. The Constitution of the United
States is, and must be, a document of grandeur and wisdom
that secures and protects the most fundamental and sacro-
sanct rights of our people. To extend the protections of the
Constitution to the most mundane fracases of everyday life
cheapens and trivializes not only the Constitution itself, but
those rights and privileges which are protected under it, as
well.2
These two opposing views highlight the disagreement over when,
if at all, a state, under the Constitution, owes one of its citizens an
affirmative duty to provide that citizen with protection from harm, and
when the failure to provide that protection is a basis for liability. 3 In
recent years, as this nation's school campuses have become increas-
ingly dangerous, students who have been injured while at school, have
invoked due process to attempt to hold their school district liable for
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Sere, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1012-13 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2 Reeves byfones v. Besonen, 754 F. Stipp. 1135, 1140-41 ii.2 (F.D. Mich. 1991).
3
 See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
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failure to protect them from harm." The plaintiff students have filed
damage suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the school officials and
school districts involved, claiming that they have deprived the students
of their Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests.'
Until very recently, the federal circuit courts of appeals have
almost universally held that school officials do not owe students, com-
pelled by state law to attend school and entrusted to their care, an
affirmative obligation to protect them from harm while in school.'
These courts have reached this conclusion based upon the Supreme
Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, which held that a state owes its citizens an affirmative duty to
protect them from harm only where the state has affirmatively acted
to place limitations on an individual's ability to act on his or her behalf,
through incarceration, institutionalization or other similar means of
restraint.? In October 1992, however, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit broke with the other circuits and created a
conflict that, to date, the Supreme Court has declined to address."
4 See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Caplinger,
Lankford v. Doe, 113 S.Ct. 1066, 1066 (1993), rehg denied, Caplinger, Mike, et. al. v. Doe, 113
S.Ct. 1436 (1993) (student brought action alleging that school officials did nothing while teacher
sexually molested her); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch,, 972 F.2d 1364, 1367
(3d Cir. 1992) (student brought action alleging that school officials were negligent in failing to
prevent sexual molestation of one student by another).
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any state . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
Personal security and freedom from physical restraint and sexual abuse are well established liberty
interests. See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying tAnct.
6 See, e.g., Maldonado v. Josey, 975 E2d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 1992); Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at
1373;10. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990). The theory of
an affirmative obligation to protect is to be contrasted with that of supervisory liability. See
Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Stoneking 111.
Under such a theory, the school district can be held liable where it is shown that the school
district is deliberately indifferent to the constitutional misbehavior of one of the school's employ.
ees. Id. Thus, although the school district is under no affirmative obligation to protect, it can be
held liable where one of its own, another state actor, has committed constitutional wrongs. Id. at
724-25. Supervisory liability, however, may not be invoked where the plaintiff alleges that he or
she was constitutionally violated by another student, who is not a slate actor. Id. at 724. Were a
court to find that an affirmative obligation to protect did exist, the school would be under a duty
to protect the child from harm at the hands of both public and private actors. DeShaney, 109 S.
CL at 1005-06. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the DeShaney
opinion.
7 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
9
 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 147.
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This Note argues that although public schools exercise substantial
authority over their students, this is not enough under DeShaney to
create an affirmative obligation to protect them, as exists in the con-
texts of prisons and mental hospitals. Section I discusses the back-
ground and development of the § 1983 lawsuit.' Section II explores
the concept of a "special relationship" existing between the state and
a citizen, the obligations created by such a relationship, and the appli-
cability, if any, to public schools before 1989. 1 ° Section II also discusses
the constitutional changes in public schools wrought by Supreme
Court decisions beginning in the late 1960s." Section III analyzes the
DeShaney decision and its impact on the special relationship analysis. 12
Section IV explores the impact of DeShaney on public schools and how
lower courts responded to the DeShaney holding. 13 Section V discusses,
Doe v. Taylor School District, the 1992 Fifth Circuit decision that created
a conflict in the courts of appeals as to the applicability of special
relationships to schools." Finally, Section VI argues that special rela-
tionships are inapplicable to schools, when read in light of DeShaney,
past Supreme Court decisions, and the nature of the modern school
environment. 15
I. SECTION 1983 LIABILITY
Congress enacted section 1983 of the United States Code as part
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, along with the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment.'" This statute represented a congressional attempt
to provide a remedy for constitutional violations propagated by state
el See infra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 39-61 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
72 See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 97-140 and accompanying text,
11 See infra notes 141-198 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 199-273 and accompanying text.
16 See Laura S. Harper, Battered Women Suing Police For Failure to Intervene,. Viable Legal
Avenues AfterDeShaneyv. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 75 CoRNELL L. Rim
1393,1395 (1990).
An important motive for the passage of § 1983 was to provide is federal Ibrum for civil rights
claims, thus enabling plaintiffs to bypass state courts.
One reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts
because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state
laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,
privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be
denied by state agencies.
Id, at 1395 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,180 (1961)).
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officials acting pursuant to their governmental authority.' 7 Before
1961, suits under section 1983 were sustained only where the conduct
in question was authorized by federal or state law, as, where the official
acted in compliance with an unconstitutional or illegal statute.' 8
In the 1961 decision of Monroe v. Pape, the United States Supreme
Court dramatically increased the applicability of section 1983 by ex-
tending section 1983 liability to those situations where the individual
official, who allegedly violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff,
acted in an official capacity, but in a manner not authorized by state
law.' 9 In Monroe, the plaintiff brought a section 1983 suit against police
officers who broke into his house in the middle of the night and
conducted an illegal search." The Monroe Court reasoned that al-
though the challenged conduct, an illegal search, might be unlawful
under state law, it nonetheless was to be considered "under color of
law" for the purpose of section 1983 if it was undertaken by a state
official acting in an official capacity. 21
Additionally, section 1983 has been invoked to hold liable not only
the "offending" individuals, who directly violated the plaintiff's consti-
tutionally-protected rights, but also to hold liable those government
agencies or supervisory personnel of the individual.22 In the 1978 case
17 See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 381, 389-90 (1989) (permitting suit under
section 1983 where municipality failed to train police 'officers to provide medical care to detained
individuals); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169, 172 (permitting suit under section 1983 where police
officers entered home in middle of night and forced plaintiff to stand naked while illegal search
took place).
18 See, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 455, 458-59 (1960) (Court overturned convic-
tion of a black bus passenger, arrested for violating a Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor
for any person "without authority of law" to remain upon the premises of another after having
been forbidden to do so, as a violation of Due Process and Commerce Clauses); Schneider v.
State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 154-55, 160-61 (1939) (Court invalidated a municipal
ordinance prohibiting solicitation and distribution of circulars unless licensed by police, includ-
ing censorship, as an abridgement of the freedom of speech secured against state invasion by the
Fourteenth Amendment); Hague v. CIO., 307 U.S, 496, 500, 514 (1939) (Court held ordinance
void on its face because it provided for previous administrative censorship of the exercise of the
right of speech and assembly in appropriate places). For a case after 1961, see Adieltes u S.H.
Kress Co. & Co., in which the plaintiff, a white woman, had been denied service in defendant's
restaurant because she was in the company of black children, and could make out a claim under
section 1983 by showing the existence of state-enforced custom of segregating races in public
eating places. 398 U.S. 144, 147, 167-68 (1970).
19 365 U.S. at 172. See also Steven F. Huefner, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After
DeShaney, 90 CoLum. L. REV. 1940, 1943-44, 1944 n.19 (1990) (noting that section 1983 was
"relatively unimportant prior to Monroe").
20 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.
21 1d. at 172.
22 See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-90 (1989); Pembauer v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986); Molten v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
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of Monell v. New York City DSS, the United States Supreme Court held
that local government bodies were directly suable for damages as a
result of constitutional violations committed by subordinates." In
Mane11, the plaintiffs brought a section 1983 action against the school
board alleging that the Board had, as a matter of official policy, com-
pelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before
medically necessary." According to the Court, local government liabil-
ity under section 1983 may not be based on a respondent superior
theory, but only upon the direct actions of the supervisors:25
To prevail in a suit against a government entity, the plaintiff must
show that the supervisory personnel "implement a policy so deficient
that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the
moving force of the constitutional violation.'' 2b In the 1989 case of City
of Canton v. Harris, the United States Supreme Court held that liability
may be imposed where supervisors are "deliberately indifferent" to the
rights of persons with whom their subordinates come into contact, such
that their own conduct may be seen as an implicit condonation of their
subordinate's abuse of authority.'" In Canton, the Court imposed liabil-
ity on the city for its failure to train its police officers to provide medical
care to injured persons detained by the police." In order for liability
to attach based on this theory, with one notable exception, the super-
visory officials must have been deliberately indifferent to the miscon-
duct of other state actors:" Through the United States Constitution,
23 Monett, 436 U.S. at 690. The Court held that municipalities and other public entities could
be liable as "persons" under § 1983. Id. On this point, the Court specifically overruled Monroe,
which had held that municipalities were immune from section 1983 liability. See id, at 696-701.
24 Id. at 660-61.
25 Id. at 694-95; See also Pembauer, 475 U.S. at 478 (municipal bodies cannot be liable under
section 1983 for the. tortious acts of employees which do not represent official policy).
26 See Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2cl 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Pembauer, 475 U.S. at 483
("liability under § 1983 attaches where . . a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made
from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy
with respect to the subject matter in question.").
27 489 U.S. at 381, 389-90 (municipality can be held liable for the failure to provide medical
care to individuals detained by police officers where the "failure to train those officers amounts
to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact");
Jane Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 901 F.2d 642, 645 (81.11 Cir. 1990) (when
school officials are on "notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates,
the Constitution will not tolerate a practice of deliberate or conscious indifference to the
potentiality of harm that is likely to follow"); Stoneking 11, 882 F.2(1 720, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1989)
(school official can be held liable if he "maintains a practice of reckless indifference to instances
of known or suspected sexual abuse of students by teachers, in concealing complaints of abuse,
and in discouraging students' complaints about such conduct").
28 Harris, 489 U.S. at 381, 389-90.
29 See id. at 389-90; Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986) (where court held that
government could not be held liable under § 1983 for conduct that is "merely negligent"). The
102	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:97
individuals may derive two distinct protections from government con-
duct, the violation of which triggers a § 1983 remedy. 3° First, the Con-
stitution imposes on the government a duty to refrain from action
which interferes with a citizen's protected interests." Most § 1983 suits
challenge that the government has taken some affirmative act which
contravenes the Constitution's protections of the individual interest to
be free from government interference." Section 1983 is designed to
protect all citizens from government interference."
Alternatively, the government may also be held liable under sec-
tion 1983 where it in fact had an affirmative obligation to act to protect
the safety of one of its citizens from harm at the hands of others. 34
Although the Constitution has been called a "charter of negative lib-
erties," an obligation to act may exist in two situations.35 First, the
government has an affirmative obligation to police the conduct of its
subordinates and protect against potential constitutional misbehav-
ior." Thus, a court may impose liability under section 1983 where the
government has been deliberately indifferent to the misconduct of
other state actors under its employ." The second situation may occur
where the government has entered into a "special relationship" with
one notable exception referred to constitutes the main subject of this note. Where the state has
entered into a "special relationship" with an individual, it owes that individual an affirmative duty
to protect that individual and may not maintain a policy of deliberate indifference even where
the alleged harm comes at the hands of a private third party. DeShaney v. Winnebago County
DSS, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1006 (1989). See infra notes 34-46 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the origins of the special relationship obligations.
30 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1006 (1989); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
31 See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172 (permitting suit under § 1983 where police unlawfully
search plaintiffs apartment, in violation of Fourth Amendment).
32 1•1uefner, supra note 19, at 1943.
" Id. at 1945. This is in contrast to the affirmative obligation to protect which arises only
where the government has entered into a special relationship with the injured individual.
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006. See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
DeShaney decision.
34 See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 32 (1983) (holding prison liable for failure to protect
inmate from dangerous comrade); &melting II, 882 F.2d at 724-25 (holding school district liable
for failure to protect student from sexual abuse by teacher). In this situation, a § 1983 plaintiff
may allege governmental inaction, claiming that the inaction has worked a deprivation of a
constitutionally protected interest. Wade, 461 U.S. at 32.
'Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
36 Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 725.
37 See Harris, 489 U.S. at 389-90 (municipality held liable where its failure to train police
officers amounted to deliberate indifference of detained individual's constitutional rights);
Sianeking II, 882 F.2d at 724-25 (school district held liable where its failure to protect student
from sexual abuse by teacher amounted to deliberate indifference of student's rights).
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the individual." The issues surrounding special relationships are ex-
plored in the next section.
II. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS
A. Before DeShaney
Where a court finds that an individual has entered into a special
relationship with the state, the state owes that individual a duty to
provide for and ensure his or her safety and freedom from bodily
restraint." Before 1989, courts had found that such a duty did exist
when the state has incarcerated or institutionalized an individual, so
as to deprive the individual of the ability to protect himself or herself,
or where the state may have taken the individual into custody, assured
the individual's safety, or exposed the individual to unusual risk. 40
Significantly, where a special relationship exists, the state owes the
individual a duty to provide for his or her safety and to protect him or
her from harm at the hands of both state actors and possibly even
private individuals.'
In the 1980 case of Martinez u California, the United States Su-
preme Court raised the possibility that the state might, in certain
" See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). The concept of "special relationships"
is usually traced this case. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006. In Estelle, the court held that when a state
incarcerates someone it must then provide medical care to that person. 429 U.S. at 99, 105.
39 See, e,g., Revere v. Mass. Gen. Flosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244-45 (1983) (duty to provide medical
care to arrestees); Wade, 461 U.S, at 32 (prison has duty to protect inmate from dangerous
comrade); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (duty of care for institutionalized
mental patients); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04 (state has duty to protect and provide services to
convicted prisoners).
1° See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320 (mental patients); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,
285 (1980) (special relationship may exist between prison officials and victim murdered by
paroled prisoner); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (prisoners); Lopez v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 817
F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1987) (special relationship may exist between school official and children
compelled by law to attend public school); Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 508-11
(3d Cir. 1985) (special relationship may exist when youth services department knows child is
being abused and has taken steps to protect her); Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618 (special relationship
may exist between the government and an individual whom the state has put in a position of
danger); Doe v, New York City DSS, 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981) (special relationship may
exist between state arid children placed by state in foster care); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381,
383-85 (7th Cir. 1979) (special relationship found to exist between police and child passengers
of vehicle when police detained driver).
'II See Martinez, 444 U.S. at 279, 285 (where the plaintiff's decedent had been murdered by
a paroled prisoner, released despite warning to the parole board of danger); Bowers, 686 F.2d at.
618 (Where "the state puts a person in position of danger from private persons and then Fails to
protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active
tortfcasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit").
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circumstances, be held liable for the failure to protect an individual
from harm by a third party. 42 In Martinez, the plaintiff attempted to
hold the state liable where a paroled prisoner, released despite warn-
ings of danger, murdered the plaintiffs decedent,*The Court rejected
the section 1983 claim as too attenuated from the challenged state
conduct, but did not foreclose the possibility that a parole officer could
be held liable for action taken in connection with the release of a
prisoner on parole."
In sum, until 1989, when the Supreme Court decided to hear a
Seventh Circuit case involving a young boy beaten by his father,* the
Court had not addressed the full scope of when an affirmative duty to
protect existed.*
B. Special Relationships & Schools Before 1989
One of the principal questions confronting circuit courts of ap-
peals regarding the notion of the government's affirmative duties to
protect was whether the required special relationship existed in the
nation's public schools. 47 Under the common law in loco parentis doc-
trine, it was thought that school officials were to act on behalf of
students' welfare, as a reasonable parent would, when harm was rea-
sonably foreseeable, and that this carried with it an obligation to
protect the students from danger, regardless of the source.* Two cir-
cuits, the Third and the Fifth, found that because of compulsory school
attendance laws and the nature and immaturity of schoolchildren, such
a special relationship existed.*
In the 1982 case of Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that
because "schoolchildren are too young to be considered capable of
mature restraint, public school assumes a duty to protect schoolchil-
42 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980).
45 1d. at 279.
44 Id. at 285 (declaring: "[w]e need not and do not decide that a parole officer could never
be deemed to 'deprive' someone of life by action taken in connection with the release of a
prisoner on parole.").
45 DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987).
46 DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, 109 S. CL 998, 1002 (1989) ("[b]ecause of the
inconsistent approaches taken by the lower courts . . . and the importance of the issue to the
administration of state and local governments, we granted certiorari").
47 See Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1988) [hereinafter
Stoneking
49 See Huefiner, supra note 19, at 1967.
49 See Stoneking I, 856 F.2d at 601; Lopez, 817 F.2d at 356; Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch.
Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1982).
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dren from the dangers posed by and-social activities-their own and those
of other students."5° In Horton, the court was confronted with the con-
stitutionality of dog sniff searches of students in schools." In holding
the searches unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit established that al-
though students had Fourth Amendment rights, the special relation-
ship between school officials and students, and the corresponding
duties assumed by the state mandated a less than probable cause
standard. 52 Thus, although the Fifth Circuit expanded the constitu-
tional rights of students in school, the court still expressed the belief
that the students and school officials were in a special relationship."
Further, in 1987, in Lopez v. Houston Independent School District,
the Fifth Circuit held that a school district could be held liable for
injuries sustained by a student, even though the harm was caused by a
private actor, such as another student." In Lopez, the plaintiff student
brought a section 1983 action against the school district where a school
employee, a bus driver, failed to break up a fight between the plaintiff
and another student.•• The Fifth Circuit found that the school district
could be held liable for the bus driver's failure to break up a fight
between schoolchildren if his failure to protect the injured child rose
to the level of callous indifference to the student's right to be free from
bodily harm."
i° 690 F.2d at 480 (emphasis added). The court specifically rejected grounding this duty on
the doctrine of in loco parentis. Id.
51 Id. at 474.
52 Id. at 480-81. The Supreme Court eventually adopted the Filth Circuit's position in regard
to searches conducted by school officials of students entrusted to their care. New jersey v. TLO,
469 U.S. 325, 336-37, 341 (1984). In 7'LO, the Supreme Court held that school officials were
subject to the confines of the Fourth Amendment. in conducting searches of students. Id. at
336-37. Although the Court held that the Fourth Amendment required less suspicion to search
students in school than is required m the adult world, TLO extended the trend begun in the late
1960's of extending constitutional protections to school students and constitutional limitations
to school officials. See, e.g., Ingrahm v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669-70 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U,S. 565, 573-74 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep, Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 50'3, 505-06
(1969). Thus, while the 5th Circuit recognized that school officials have "special duties with
associated powers," it also recognized that those powers did have constitutional limits. Horton,
690 F.2d at 480 n.18. See infra notes 62-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence in the public schools and its affect on the special relationship analysis.
53 Horton, 690 F.2d at 480-81.
'1 817 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1987).
55 Id. at 352-53.
66 Id. at 356. Various circuit courts of appeals had held that a student, while in school, has a
constitutionally protected interest in being free from bodily restraint and sexual assault and
molestation, and that such acts of bodily intrusion violate substantive due process and may be
remedied by section 1983 under certain circumstances. See Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist.,
817 F,2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1987) (Iclonstitution forbids schoolteachers from assaulting our
schoolchildren absent some legitimate punitive or disciplinary purpose"); Stoneking II, 882 F.2d
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Also, in 1987, in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District (Stoneking
I), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that
a special relationship exists between school officials and students en-
trusted to their care such that an affirmative obligation to protect
applied to the school. 57 In Stoneking I, the student plaintiff brought a
section 1983 action against her school district after she was sexually
molested and harassed by one of her teachers. 58 The school officials
knew the teacher had a history of such sexual misconduct, yet failed
to take any action. 59 The Third Circuit reasoned that because the
plaintiff spent a large part of her day in an environment where the
defendant school officials had ultimate control over her actions, a
special relationship did in fact exist. 6° At least as far as the Fifth Circuit
was concerned, a school district could be held liable if it was deliber-
ately indifferent to the threat of harm posed by either a school em-
ployee or by a fellow student. 6 '
C. Changing Nature of Schools Before 1989
While the courts of appeals' decisions reflected the view that
schools and students were in a relationship that might be classified as
a "special" one for purposes of the state's obligations, the United States
Supreme Court's jurisprudence reflected a different trend. 62 Balanced
against decisions finding special relationships in schools was an in-
creasing pattern in Supreme Court decisions to limit the authority of
school officials in the conduct of school order and discipline.° This
720, 726 (3d Cir. 1989) (schoolchild has a constitutional liberty interest to be free from sexual
molestation).
57 856 F.2d 594, 601-02 (3d Cir. 1987).
58 Id. at 595-96.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 601-02. Besides finding that a special relationship exists between school officials and
students entrusted to their care such that an affirmative obligation to protect applied, the Third
Circuit denied the defendants' motions' for summary judgment because the court found evi-
dence that the school officials knew or recklessly failed to discover the sexual assault. Id. at 603.
However, the Supreme Court later directed the Third Circuit to reconsider the Stoneking decision
in light of the DeShaney decision. Smith v. Stoneking. 109 S. Ct. 1333, 1333-34 (1989). See infra
notes 103-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the subsequent history of the Stoneking
I decision.
61 See Lopez, 817 F.2d at 356. The court held that the bus driver's failure to protect the
schoolchild from the assault by a fellow student or to render emergency aid would amount to an
abuse of state power and support a section 1983 action if it rose to the level of callous indifference
and was a cause of the injury. Id. The Lopez case was cited with approval by the case that is the
chief subject of this note. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist,, 975 F.2d 137, 145 (5th Cir. 1992).
62 See Stoneking I, 856 F.2d at 601-02; Lopez, 817 F.2d at 355-56; Horton, 690 F.2d at 480-81.
66 See Newiersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 336 (l984); Ingrahm v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669-70
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was accomplished through two means." First, the Supreme Court
granted specific constitutional rights to students while in public school,
rights that were to be protected from infringement absent a legitimate
school disciplinary purpose," Second, the Supreme Court altered the
role of the school officials themselves."
Beginning with the 1969 decision of Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent School District, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that students in school are "persons" under the Constitution, and that
the state, in its dealings with students, must respect the liberties con-
tained in the Bill of Rights.° In Tinker, the Court struck down a school
regulation prohibiting students from wearing armbands to protest
government policy in Vietnam. 68
 The Court stated that "[t] he Four-
teenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not
excepted."6y The Tinker decision was the first in a subsequent line of
Court cases that empowered students with new constitutional rights. 70
(1977); Goss V. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969).
64 See TLO, 469 U.S. at 336.
65
 See, e.g., id. at 336 (students have Fourth Amendment rights while in school); Gass, 419
U.S. at 573-74 (students have Due Process rights while in school); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06
(students have First Amendment rights while in school).
66 See TLO, 469 U,S. at 336.
67 393 U.S. at 507, 511. Previously, the Court's position was that, under the common law, the
nature of the state-child relationship was "custodial" and thus, the school official could not
"deprive the child of any rights, because he had none." Id. at 511.
68 Id. at 504-05.
69 Id. at 507 (quoting West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943)).
70 See TLO, 469 U.S. at 336 (students have Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of
privacy rights while in school); Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No, 26 v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (removal of books from school libraries because school board disap-
proved of ideas contained in the books violated students' First Amendment rights); Goss, 419 U.S.
at 573 (when granted by state statute, the right to an education is irrevocable unless proceeded
by 'fundamentally fair procedures" which consist of a minimum of notice to the student of
charges against him and of the opportunity to be heard, anything less violates Due Process);
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06 (students have First Amendment rights in school). One commentator
has also written that the Court may have determined that students are also entitled to Fifth
Amendment rights, specifically the right against self-incrimination in school disciplinary hearings.
See Roberti. Goodwin, 'Ike Fifth Amendment in Schools: A Rationale For Its Application In Investi-
gation and Disciplinary Proceedings, 28 Wm. & MARY L. RIM, 683, 689-90 (1987) (citing In re
Gault, 387 U.S, I , 47-48 (1967) ("(1] he privilege against self-incrimination can be claimed in any
proceeding, be it criminal or civil administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory .").
Id. Several lower courts have held that students arc entitled to at least some measure of Fifth
Amendment protection. See. Picozzi v. Sandalow, 623 F. Supp, 1571, 1575-76 (E.D. Mich. 1986);
Pollnow v. Glennon, 594 F. Supp. 220, 223 (S,D.N.Y. 1984); Gonzales v. McEven, 435 F. Supp. 460,
470-71 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
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Not only were students gaining fundamental rights, but the Court
was also changing the authority of school officials." In the 1984 deci-
sion of New Jersey v. TLO, the United States Supreme Court held that
school officials must abide by the commands of the Fourth Amend-
ment and were prohibited from conducting illegal searches and sei-
zures of students pursuant to school disciplinary policies:72 In TLO, the
Court held that a search of a student's pocketbook, suspected of
containing marijuana, was to be judged by the standards of the Fourth
Amendment." The Court reasoned that students have a reasonable
expectation of privacy while in school and extended the constitutional
rights of students to include those under the Fourth Amendment,
joining these new rights with those already granted in the Court's past
decisions. 74
In terms of the special relationship analysis, what is most sig-
nificant about the Court's decision in TLO, is its characterization of
school officials." Previously, it was thought that school officials and
teachers act in loco parentis in their dealings with students." Their
authority was that of the parent, not the State, and therefore, it was
thought that school officials, like parents, were not subject to the
restrictions contained in the Constitution. 77 Under such a common law
theory, schools were to act on behalf of students' welfare and like the
children's parents were free from constitutional restraints in pursuit of
that welfare." In TLO, the Court rejected this theory, recognizing that
the concept of parental delegation as a source of school authority was
not "entirely consonant" with modern school policy." Instead, the
Court stated that today's public school officials do not merely exercise
authority voluntarily conferred on them by parents, but act in further-
ance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies. 80
Thus, school officials act as representatives of the state, and cannot
claim immunity from the strictures of the Constitution. 8' In sum, while
71 See TLO, 469 U.S. at 336.
72 1d.
73 Id. at 328-29,337.
71 See id. at 336 (Fourth Amendment); Goss, 419 U.S. at 573 (Due Process); Tinker, 393 U.S.
at 505-06 (First Amendment).
75 See TLO, 469 U.S. at 336.
76 1d.
"Id. at 332 11.2 (citing cases).
78 Id.
79 1d. at 336 (citing Inv-Am v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,662 (1977)).
8° MO, 469 U.S. at 336.
81 Id. at 336-37. One commentator has suggested that TLO's rejection of the in loco parentis
doctrine is the Court's denial of the existence of a special relationship between school officials
and students. Goodwin, supra note 70, at 686 n.I4 (writing two years before DeShatr).
December 1993]	 LESSONS OF DESHANEY 	 109
the courts of appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits were reaffirming
the common law obligations on school officials, the Supreme Court,
by granting more constitutional rights to students, was imposing new
constitutional limits on the authority of those same school officials."
III. DESFIANEY V. WINNEBAGO DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
A. The Court's Opinion
In 1989, because of what it called "inconsistent approaches taken
by lower courts" in confronting the special relationship dilemma, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to a case that would have a profound
impact on the public schools." For constitutional scholars, the facts of
DeShaney are well-known: a four-year-old boy was beaten into a life-
threatening coma by his father, after being returned to his father's
custody by the county department of social services." Joshua
DeShaney's mother brought a section 1983 action against the depart-
ment, alleging that the department's failure to protect her son from
his father violated his rights and liberty interest in bodily integrity in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 85
The DeShaney Court, despite what it called "tragic facts," refused
to impose liability on the department on the grounds that the Consti-
tution imposes no duty on the state to provide protective services
against the deprivation of life, liberty and property interests by other
means besides the state itself." Thus, the department was under no
52 See TLO, 469 U.S. at 336; but see Sloneking 1, 856 F.2d 594, 601-02 (3d Cir. 1988); Horton
v. Goose Creek Inclep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1982).
"DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1989).
84 Id. at 1001-02. The county became familiar with Joshua in January 1983, when he was
hospitalized lit' injuries suspected to be the result of abuse. Id. The county social services
department released him to his father, who had had custody ofJoshua since divorcing his mother
in 1980. Id. Monthly visits to the home by a caseworker revealed ongoing abuse, and Joshua was
twice subsequently hospitalized. Id. Despite evidence of mounting serious abuse, neither the
caseworker nor the department took any further attempts to try to protect the child. Id.
AS
	 at 1002. U.S. CoNs'r, amend. XIV states in pertinent pare " . . . nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without d ue process of law."
se DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. at 1001, 1003.
Nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to
protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.
The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee
of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the state itself to deprive
individuals of life, liberty or property without `due process of law', but its language
cannot be fairly extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the state to ensure
that those interests do not come to harm through other means.
Id.
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constitutional obligation to protect Joshua from the violence of his
father, a private actor.81 It was what followed in the Court's opinion that
is significant in the context of public schools.
In dicta, the Court then chose to severely limit those instances
where the state owes an affirmative duty, by reason of its special rela-
tionship with its citizens, to protect them from harm from others. 88 The
Court held that the "affirmative duty to protect arises not from the
State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expres-
sions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it imposed
on his freedom to act on his own behalf." 89 Therefore, a special rela-
tionship exists only where the state has taken a person into custody
and by its "affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act
on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other
similar restraint of personal liberty-does the state then owe the individ-
ual an affirmative obligation to protect from harm by others." 9° Al-
though leaving the question of the complete list of those in special
relationships with the state unanswered, the Court did indicate that
only those individuals who have been rendered unable to care for their
own welfare, like those in prisons and mental hospitals, are owed
corresponding duties to be protected by the state from third parties. 91
B. Post-DeShaney Problem
Despite the Supreme Court's attempts to end the ambiguity that
had existed, the DeShaney opinion, especially when read in the context
of schools, has spawned much litigation. The goal of this litigation has
been to determine the applicability, if any, of the Court's analysis to
public schools. 92 The insertion of the phrase ". . . or other similar
87 Id. at 1006.
88 Id. at 1005-06. Petitioners contended that a special relationship existed between the State
and Joshua because the State knew that the boy faced a danger of abuse at his father's hands,
and "specifically proclaimed, by word and by deed, its intention to protect him against that
danger." Id. at 1004.
89 M. at 1006.
90 1d.
91 DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. at 1006. The Court did indicate, in an oft-cited footnote, that an
affirmative duty to protect might arise where the state, by the affirmative exercise of its power,
removes a child from free society and places him in a foster home operated by its agents. Id. at
n.9. However, the Court refused to express a view on the validity of this argument. Id. Several
courts of appeals have seized on this footnote to hold that a special relationship exists and an
affirmative obligation to protect arises in the foster home situation. See, e.g., Yvonne L. v. New
Mexico Dept. of Human Services, 959 F.2d 883, 891 (10th Cir. 1992); K.H. through Murphy v.
Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990); Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1438-39 (5th Cir.
1990).
92 See Huefner, supra note 19, at 1951 n.69 (citing the federal cases both before and after
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restraint of personal liberty" has been interpreted by some courts to
indicate that a special relationship may exist between school officials
and students, who may in effect be in custody of the state because of
compulsory attendance laws. 93 Where a court finds that a special rela-
tionship does exist, an affirmative obligation to provide protective
services may be imposed on the school even to the extent of providing
protection from private actors, such as a fellow student." Additionally,
DeShaney raised the specter that where a special relationship exists, the
court owes the individual an affirmative obligation to provide "un-
defined" protective services 95 Conversely, where a court finds that no
DeShaney). In the eighteen subsequent months following DeSharr, at least five new suits were
reported, already exceeding the number of reported decisions in this field in the ten years prior
to DeShaney. Id. In addition to the cases cited by the Huefner note, several other cases were
reported in the two years after publication and have been cited by this note. See Black v. Indiana
Area Sch. Dist., 985 E2d 707 (3d Cir. 1993); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 E2d 137 (5th
Cir. 1992); Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir, 1992); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992); Robbins v, Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 56, 807 E Supp.
11 (D.Me. 1992); Elliot v. New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1992); Dorothy
J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 794 F. Stipp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist.,
784 F. Stipp. 1576 (N.D. Ca. 1992); Waechter v. School Dist. No. 14-030 of Casopolis, Mich., 773
F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Mich. 1991); Doe v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 770 F. Supp. 591 (D.Colo.
1991); Arroyo v. PLA, 748 E Supp. 56 (D. P.R. 1990).
"DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 100(1. See also Stoneking 1, 856 F.2(1 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1988)
("R.)) ecause students are placed in school at the command of the state and are not free to decline
to attend, students are in what may be viewed as functional custody of the school authorities
. ."); Waechter, 773 F. Supp. at 1009 (finding that a custodial relationship exists in schools);
Arroyo, 748 F. Supp. at 59 (finding that students were in custody of state while in school but
refusing to impose affirmative obligation to protect. on schools).
94 See Lopez v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1987) (school liable
where bus driver deliberately indifferent to assault of student by another student); Pagano v.
Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Stipp. 641, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (school district might be liable
where student was physically and verbally abused by other students).
DeShaney, 109 S. CL at 1006 (", , . when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power
so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself and at the same
time fails to provide for his basic human needs, e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
reasonable safety, it transgresses the substantive limits of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Young-
berg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding that when the state institutionalizes an
individual it is obligated to provide that individual with adequate food, shelter, clothing, and
medical care); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (duty to provide prisoners with
medical care), These cases indicate the most basic needs the State must provide to those within
its "custody", under the DeShaney holding. However, other courts had previously and subsequently
indicated other kinds or affirmative obligations the State must satisfy under its undertaking of a
special relationship. See Bounds v, Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977) (prison officials have affirma-
tive duty to assist prisoners in exercise of their rights to access of courts); Lipscomb v. Simmons,
884 F.2d 1242, 1245-49 (9th Cir. 1989) (state has affirmative obligation to assist children in state
custody in exercising their fundamental constitutional rights, such as the right to family integrity
and association); Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Imitates v. Lanzero, 834 E2d 326, 337-38
(3d Cir. 1987) (prison officials have affirmative obligation to assist prisoners in exercise of their
right to abortions); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (prison officials have
affirmative duty to assist prisoners in exercise of their right of observance of religious dietary and
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special relationship exists, school officials are under an obligation only
to refrain from acting "deliberately indifferent" to the misconduct of
their employees. 96
IV.. COURTS' RESPONSES TO DESHANEY
After DeShaney, the federal courts were confronted with two kinds
of section 1983 suits brought by students against school officials, alleg-
ing constitutional violations. 97 The first involved instances where a
school employee was accused of sexually assaulting or injuring a stu-
dent." The second dealt with the issue of liability when a student
alleges sexual assault or injury by a fellow student 99
A. Supervisory Liability
In cases where a school official allegedly sexually assaulted a stu-
dent, the circuit courts ruled that DeShaney did not affect liability
where the offending actor was a state actor.m Regardless of whether
the court considered students to be in a special relationship with the
school district, the circuit courts ruled that nothing in the Supreme
Court's opinion altered the fact that school officials could be held
liable for their deliberate indifference to actions taken by subordi-
nates.'" Although DeShaney may have foreclosed the possibility of im-
posing liability where the offending actor was a private citizen, where
other laws); B.14. v. Johnson, 715 F. Stipp. 1387, 1392-93 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (child in state custody
has substantive due process right, which the state must protect, to be free from unreasonable and
unnecessary intrusions on both physical and emotional well-being).
99 See Black, 985 F.2d at 707 (finding no liability against school officials where private actor
committed sexual assault); Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372 (no liability against school officials,
because of no special relationship, where student was sexually assaulted by other students);
Stoneking //, 882 F.2d 720, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1989) (liability against school district not because of
special relationship but because student sexually assaulted by teacher, a state acto').
97 See Middle Bunks, 972 F.2d at 1365 (student sexually assaulted by other students); Stoneking
II, 882 F.2d at 721 (student sexually assaulted by teacher).
98 See Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 1992); J.O. v. Alton Community Unit
School Dist., 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990); D.T. v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.2d 1176, 1184 (10th
Cir. 1990); Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 720; Waechter, 773 F. Supp. at 1009; Doug/as County, 770 F.
Supp. at 592; Robert G. v. Newburgh Sch. Dist., 1990 WL 3210, at * 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1990);
Tilson v. School Dist of Philadelphia, 1990 WL 98932, *8-9 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1990).
99 See Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1367; Robbins, 807 F. Supp. at 13; Elliot v. New Miami Bd. of
Ethic., 799 F. Supp. 818, 819 (S.D. Ohio 1992); DorothyJ. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 794 F. Stipp.
1405, 1414 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Russell, 784 F. Supp. at 1578; Arroyo, 748 F. Stipp. at 60; Pagano, 714
F. Supp. at 641.
lu() See Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 724-25.
ioi Id.
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it is the state, through one of its subordinates, which has deprived a
citizen of life, liberty or property, the Due Process Clause of the Con-
stitution has clearly been implicated. 102 The first federal court to ad-
dress the dilemma after the DeShaney decision was the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which had been directed to
re-consider its decision in Stoneking I, in light of DeShaney. 103 In Stonek-
ing I, the court had held that a special relationship did exist in the
school context.'" The Stoneking II court, hearing the appeal again on
direction of the Supreme Court, changed its holding.'" The court
noted that the primary difference between DeShaney and the case
before it, was that in Stoneking II, a state actor, the teacher, was accused
of the sexual assault, while in DeShaney, a private actor had committed
the violence.m This difference allowed the Third Circuit to hold that
the school district could be liable upon sufficient proof that its delib-
erate indifference to the actions of one of its subordinates represented
a custom, policy or practice in violation of the student's constitutional
rights, regardless of whether a special relationship did in fact exist.m
Even though the court rested its decision on supervisory liability, it also
addressed the special relationship question in post-DeShaney schools.m
Despite the statement that in light of DeShaney it could no longer rely
on a theory imposing the affirmative obligation to protect students
established in Stoneking I, the court, in dicta, stated that "[a] rguably,
our earlier discussion noting that 'students are in what may be viewed
as functional custody of the school authorities during their presence
at school' . . . is not inconsistent with the DeShaney opinion."'''' Other
courts, confronted by the special relationship issue, have cited this
statement. 11)
102 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
1°3
 See Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 723.
1 " Stoneking 1, 856 F.2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1988).
Stoneking 11, 882 F.2d at 724-25.
'°6 !d. at 724.
1 °7 Id. at 724-25.
108 Id. at 722-23. The Court did not reach a conclusion as to the breadth of the special
relationships existing between the state and individuals. Id. "'IA'e prefer not to rest our decision
again on an affirmative duty to protect such students in this situation because the uncertainty of
the law in this respect may cause further delay." Id.
109 /d. at 723.
1111 See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 147 (5th Cir. 1902). What is ironic is that
the Third Circuit, in U.R. at Middle Backs Area Vocational 'Tech. Sch., appeared to end any validity
to this statement, yet it continues to be cited. 972 F.2d at 1372. See infra notes 114-19 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Third Circuit's change of position.
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B. Student Versus Student
When a student alleges that he or she was sexually assaulted by
another student, the plaintiff may not plead supervisory liability since
no state actor is involved." In this situation, courts are directly forced
to address whether the special relationship exists in schools such that
an affirmative duty to protect the students from harm arises."' With
very few exceptions, courts have, since DeShaney and Stoneking
rejected the contention that students are in a special relationship with
the state.'"
1. No Special Relationship
In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, settled the
unanswered issue raised by its earlier decision in Stoneking II, and held
that students compelled by law to attend school are not in a special
relationship with the state."" In Middle Bucks, the plaintiff alleged that
she was sexually assaulted by other students, and argued that a special
relationship existed between herself and the school during the school
day because compulsory attendance laws so restrained her liberty in-
terests that she should be deemed to be in state custody." 5 As a result,
she claimed that the state owed her an affirmative duty to protect her
from the harm posed by her fellow classmates." 6 The Middle Bucks
court rejected these arguments and held that students are not subject
to the same severe and continuous state restrictions that render indi-
viduals wholly dependent on the state to meet their basic needs, as are
prisoners and mental patients.'" Unlike individuals whom the state has
111 See Middle Bucks, 972 E2d at 1364; see also supra note 99 for other cases.
112 Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1364.
113 See Maldonado v. josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 1992) (school district not liable where
child caught on his bandanna in cloakroom and choked to death because no affirmative duty to
protect against harm not inflicted by the state); Middle Bunks, 972 F.2d at 1372 (school not liable
for sexual assault of student by other students); .1.0. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d
267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990) (school district not liable for sexual assault of student by teacher under
theory of affirmative obligation). Bul see Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641, 643
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that school did owe some duty to protect in refusing to dismiss section
1983 suit brought against school for alleged physical abuse by fellow students).
114 972 17,2d at 1372. The court considered this question an open one after its opinion in
Stoneking II. Id.
113 1d. at 1370-71.
"6 /d.
117/d.
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incarcerated or institutionalized, public schoolchildren remain resi-
dents in their home, under the care and supervision of their parents,
who are responsible for providing for their basic needs and who may
turn to persons unrelated to the state for help." 8
 Based upon these
assertions, the court refused to extend the special relationship affirma-
tive obligation to include schoolchildren compelled to attend school.' 19
The reasoning used by the Middle Bucks court has been invoked
by other courts in the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits to reject the special relationship argument contem-
plated by the Slouching II decision.' 2° Although some of these courts
conceded that schoolchildren, while in school, were in the custody of
the state, they refused to equate that custody with the total deprivation
"8 Id. at 1372. The Court based its reasoning on several Pennsylvania statutes which restrict
the authority exercised by school officials and affirm the authority and decision-making power
of parents, even while the child is in school. Id.
119
 Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372. A petition to the United States Supreme Court for a writ
or certiorari was filed in late 1992 and denied on January 19, 1993. 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1093).
120 See Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1993) (no special relationship
exists between students and school such that school had affirmative obligation to protect students
from sexual abuse by bus driver employed by private contractor of the school district); Maldonado
v.,josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 1992) (no special relationship and no affirmative obligation
to protect student who choked on bandanna while in cloakroom where not inflicted by state);
Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1377 (no special relationship and no liability where school failed to
protect student from sexual assaults of fellow students);J.0. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist.,
909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990) (no special relationship and no affirmative obligation to protect
where plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a teacher and failed to plead supervisory liability); jam:
Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist. of Si Louis County, 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990) (no special
relationship analysis implicated where school bus driver sexually assaulted students); Robbins v.
Maine Sch. Admin. Dist, No, 56, 807 F. Stipp, 11, 13 (D. Me. 1992) (where court in the First
Circuit held that no special relationship exists in schools such that school had an affirmative duty
to protect student from physical and emotional assaults from other students); Elliot v. New Miami
Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818, 823 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (where court in the Sixth Circuit refused to
hold school district liable under theory of special relationship or affirmative obligation to protect
where student was harassed by other students); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 794 F. Supp.
1405, 1414 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (where court in the Eighth Circuit held that no special relationship
and no affirmative obligation in dismissing suit brought by student allegedly sexually assaulted
by another student); Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Stipp. 1576, 1580 (N.D. Ga. 1992)
(where court. in the Eleventh Circuit held that no affirmative duty to protect student assaulted
by other students); Doe v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 770 F. Stipp. 591, 593-94 (D. Colo. 1991)
(where court in the Tenth Circuit held that no special relationship between student sexually
assaulted by school psychologist and school, although supervisory liability could be imposed);
Reeves by Jones v. Besonen, 754 F. Stipp. 1135, 1141 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (where court in the Sixth
Circuit refused to find special relationship and affirmative obligation where student injured by
another student during extracurricular activity); Arroyo v. PIA, 748 F. Stipp. 56, 60 (D.P.R. 1990)
(where court in the First Circuit refused to impose affirmative obligation to protect students,
where plaintiff brought suit after being that by another student); Stouffer v. Orangeville Sch.
Dist., 1990 WI, 304250, *4-5 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 1990) (where court in the Seventh Circuit held
that no affirmative obligation to protect where student sexually assaulted by other students).
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of liberty rights that exists in the prison and mental hospital contexts. 121
Still, other courts were unwilling to find that compulsory attendance
laws placed students in the custody of the state at all, as DeShaney
mandated.' 22 The commonality existing in these opinions is that in
contrast to mental patients and prisoners, the state has not so re-
strained the student from exercising basic liberty rights nor has the
State deprived the students' parents from providing for their children's
food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and reasonable safety, such that
a special relationship should exist.'"
One district court went beyond the arguments used in the Middle
Bucks opinion and other court decisions that the special relationship
analysis was legally inapplicable to schools, and raised questions as to
the feasibility of imposing further constitutional duties on school
officials.'" In Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School District, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas confronted the issue
of whether school officials owed an affirmative obligation to protect a
student, assaulted by other students. 125 The Dorothy J. court found that
imposing such constitutional duties on schools, already inflicted with
the epidemic of deadly violence on school campuses, would force
school officials to assume the roles of police officers or prison guards
rather than teachers.'" Additionally, it would impose liability anytime
children skinned their knee on the playground or were beaten up by
the school bully.'" Thus, although the Dorothy J. court ultimately re-
jected the special relationship applicability to schools on the similar
basis of other courts, the court raised substantial concerns regarding
the feasibility of such an analysis, concerns that no other court had
identified.'"
121 See Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 723 ("[alrguably our earlier discussion that 'students are in
what may be viewed as functional custody of the school authorities' ... is not inconsistent with
DeShaney," however, "we prefer not to rest our decision again on an affirmative duty to protect
such students . ."); Arroyo, 748 F. Supp. at 60 ("It may be said that children are under the
custody of the State while they attend classes .. .." The court however declined to impose liability
because private actor committed wrong in question),
122 See Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 732; Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371;1.0., 909 F.2d at 272.
123 See supra note 120 for a listing of the cases.
124 Dorothy J., 794 E Supp. at 1414.
125 Id. at 1405-06.
1 2 6 Id. at 1414.
127 /d.
128 See id. The Dorothy" decision was affirmed on appeal, where the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals denied the existence of a special relationship in the schools. Dorothy J. v. Little Rock
Sch, Dist, 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993).
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2. The Other Side
There has not been complete unanimity in rejecting the special
relationship theory proposed by plaintiffs abused by private actors.' 29
In 1989, in Pagano v. Massapequa Public Schools, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, held that students,
while in school, were owed a limited duty from school officials to
protect them from harm.'" In Pagano, the plaintiff alleged that the
school failed to protect him from the verbal and physical abuse of
fellow students."' In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the
Pagano court held that although the duty to protect is not necessarily
equivalent to that existing in prisons and mental hospitals, there exists
a duty sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss."'
The Pagano court analogized the student's plight to that of chil-
dren in foster homes, a category specifically referred to but not elabo-
rated on by the DeShaney court.'" Because a pre DeShaney court in the
Pagano circuit had held that such a duty existed in the foster care
situation, the Pagano court allowed the suit to continue. ["h The court
determined that school officials, as representatives of the state, are to
assume the role of guardian of the children, who, much like foster
children are incapable of providing for themselves.'"'
In two other cases, courts specifically discussed the special rela-
tionship argument, agreeing with the Stoneking U decision that such a
relationship might exist but deciding their cases instead on supervisory
liability, because the offending party was a state actor.'" Despite these
129 See Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E,D.N.Y. 1989); Robert G. v.
Newburgh Sch. Dist., 1990 WL 3210, *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1990); Tilson v. School Dist_ of
Philadelphia, 1990 WL 98932, *8-9 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1990). It would appear likely that after the
Middle Bucks decision, the reasoning used by the Tilton court is not valid in the Third Circuit.
See Middle Bucks, 972 F.2t1 at 1377. Both the Pagano and Robert O. courts are in the Second
Circuit.
1 " 714 F. Supp. at 643.
131 Id. at 642.
'
52 1d. at 643.
133
 Id.; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago DSS, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1006 n.9 (1989).
134 Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 643. The Second Circuit had previously held that a special
relationship existed and thus, an affirmative obligation to protect arose in the foster home
situation. Doe v. New York City, 649 R2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981).
135 Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 643.
136 See Robert G., 1990 WL 3210 at *1-2 (where the court held that a student, who was sexually
assaulted by a substitute teacher, was in functional custody of the State, in denying a motion to
dismiss the suit, even though supervisory liability existed as well); Tilton, 1990 WL 98932 at *8-9
(where the court held that preschool children, sexually abused by school employee, may be in a
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decisions raising the possibility of a special relationship in schools, by
September of 1992, a majority of the circuits refused to impose liability
on the school where a plaintiff alleged harm perpetrated by another
student or non-state actor.'r The special relationship affirmative obli-
gation only extended to, at least as far as the Supreme Court had
decided, those individuals whom the state had imprisoned or institu-
tionalized.'" Lower courts had extended the special relationship analy-
sis to include those individuals removed from their natural home and
placed in foster care, or state supervision, or possibly those whom the
state had placed in a position of danger where otherwise they would
not have been, although limiting such relationships to situations where
the individual was in the functional custody of the state.'" Just as the
circuits were beginning to agree, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit broke ranks with a decision announced on Octo-
ber 21, 1992.140
special relationship with the school imposing an affirmative obligation to protect but dismissing
the suit because there was no evidence of deliberate indifference by the school officials).
137
 See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text for a listing of cases.
188 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (special relationship exists between
the state and individuals confined to state mental health facility); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
105-06 (1976) (special relationship exists between prisoners and state such that state owes duty
to provide necessary services and protection from harm).
139 See Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987, 990-91 (1st Cir. 1992) (volun-
tary mental patient not in state custody so no special relationship); Yonne L. v. New Mexico
Dept. Human Serv., 959 F.2d 883, 890 (10th Cir. 1992) (special relationship exists between state
and children placed by state in foster care); Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1067
(3d Cir. 1991) (pre-trial detainee in state custody owed duty to protect from harm); Harris v.
District of Columbia, 932 F.2d 10, 13-14 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (no special relationship because no
state custody where officers shackled victim's ankles, handcuffed him, and locked him in police
van); KH. through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Griffith v.
Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1438-39 (5th Cir. 1990) (state owes affirmative obligation to protect
children under full-time state supervision); Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1989)
(finding that police officer's instructing burglary suspect to remain in private club where there
was reason to believe suspect's safety was threatened by club owner who was interrogating him
was sufficient to constitute custody); Milburn v. Anne Arundel County DSS, 871 F.2d 474, 476
(4th Cir. 1989) (denying relief under § 1983 special relationship to child voluntarily released
from custody of state and then placed in abusive home); Was v. Young, 796 F. Stipp. 1041, 1045-47
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (rejecting special relationship and affirmative obligation to protect where
plaintiffs were spectators beaten by other attendees at fireworks display, while not in state
custody); G-69 v. Degnan, 745 F. Stipp. 254, 265 (D.N.J. 1990) (court held that a special relation-
ship existed where the state had acted affirmatively to place plaintiff in position of danger, as a
government informant, where otherwise the individual would not have been but for the state's
promise to protect and provide new identity); Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1239
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (no special relationship and no duty to protect woman from her husband during
lapse period of police protection).
''°Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 147 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Caplinger,
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V. THE DOE V. TAYLOR DECISION
A. Background
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
heard the appeal that is the subject of this note, the Circuit had not
specifically spoken on the issue of special relationships in the schools
since the Supreme Court's DeShaney decision.' 41 Previously, the Fifth
Circuit had held that a special relationship did exist between the school
and students entrusted to their care under compulsory attendance
laws."' In that case, the court used this theory of liability to hold the
school district liable where a bus driver failed to break up a fight
between students.' 43
In one post-DeShaney case, the 1990 case of Griffith v. Johnston, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a special
relationship only exists with regard to particular individuals, such as
prisoners, mental patients, pretrial detainees and possibly children in
state adoption agencies.' 44 In Griffith, the plaintiffs, adoptive parents of
troubled children, alleged that the state adoption agency, which pre-
viously had custody of the children, had violated the due process rights
of the children by failing to provide post-adoption services. 195 The
Griffith court rejected the notion that a special relationship existed
between the state and the children, reasoning that when the children
were placed in their permanent homes, the state ceased to act as
guardian of the children. 146 The court quoted the DeShaney case in
holding that a special relationship exists between the state and indi-
viduals only where the state has acted to curtail the individuals' ability,
against their will, to protect themselves."'
Lankford v. Doc, 113 S. Ct. 1066, 1066, reh'g denied, Caplinger, Mike, et. al. v. Doe, Jane, 115 S.
Ct. 1436 (1993).
" I Taylor, 975 F.2d at 145. In its analysis, the Taylor court referred back to circuit precedent
of ten years before, citing only one Fifth Circuit case involving special relationships that was
decided after DeShaney, and the case did not concern schools. Id. at 146 (citing Griffith v.
Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th Cir. 1990)).
142 See Lopez v. Houston Indep, Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1987).
143 Id.
144 899 F.2d	 1439.
' 15 1d. at 1433.
146 1d. at 1439.
147 1d. (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1006 (1989); Romeo, 457
U.S. at 320; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06).
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B. Facts & Procedural History
In October 1987, after a year of sexual involvement and molesta-
tion by a school gym teacher with Jane Doe, a fourteen-year old fresh-
man at Taylor High School, school district officials finally took action
against the teacher, Lynn Stroud, employed at the high school from
1981-87. 1 " Before Jane Doe ever entered the picture, it was no secret
within the school community that Coach Stroud had developed roman-
tic affections for a • number of young female students at the high
school.'" As early as 1985, complaints about his behavior had reached
the offices of both the superintendent and the principal.'"
When Jane Doe became a freshman at Taylor High in 1986, she
immediately became the "point of Coach Stroud's obsession." 151 He
began by writing suggestive comments on test papers, giving her high
grades without requiring that she do any work, and taking her and
other female students out to lunch during the school day and buying
them alcoholic beverages.' 52 By early January 1987, Coach Stroud be-
gan to pressure Jane Doe into having sexual intercourse and after
several requests, she finally agreed.'"
Taylor High School Principal Eddy Lankford first officially became
aware of possible misconduct when another student informed him of
the situation.' 54 In response, the principal acknowledged that he was
aware of the rumors, transferred the informing student out of Stroud's
class, and took no further action.'" Superintendent Caplinger was also
informed of the situation, although from a separate source. 156
Over the next several months, Jane Doe and Coach Stroud had
repeated sexual contact both on and off school grounds.'" Their
148 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 141. After receiving the complaints of both Jane Doe and another
student, the school district suspended Coach Stroud without pay. Id. Coach Stroud later resigned
and pled guilty to criminal charges in connection with the matter. Id.
199 Id.
15° id. al 139. Coach Stroud reportedly made little effort to conceal his fancy for young female
students, writing explicit love notes to them, letting them drive his truck, exhibiting explicit
favoritism in class toward them and physically touching them in a "manner not becoming a
schoolteacher." Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 139.
/54 Id.
155 Id.
156 /d. Superintendent Caplinger was informed of Coach Stroud's "unprofessional conduct"
with Jane Doe at a school basketball game by another school official. Id.
157 1d. Jane Doe insisted that she "gave into" Stroud and continued having sexual relations
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romantic relationship was common knowledge within the Taylor High
community, not only among students but also among teachers and
parents.' 58 The school officials met with both Jane Doe and Coach
Stroud, who each denied any wrongdoing.'" Based solely on the ada-
mant denials of Jane Doe and Stroud, the school officials were appar-
ently satisfied that the matter should be closed."°
Despite a summer relapse, the sexual contact resumed when classes
began again in the fall of Jane Doe's sophomore year."' Finally, after
becoming concerned with their daughter's relationship with Stroud,
Doe's parents contacted their attorney, who met with Jane Doe and
then with the school officials: 62 Stroud was then suspended without
pay and later resigned:" Jane Doe then brought a civil rights suit, in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas,
against her teacher, the school district, the superintendent and the
principal, alleging violations of due process and equal protection aris-
ing from the sexual molestation by her teacher,'" The defendants filed
a motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.'"
When the district court denied the motion, the school officials ap-
pealed.'"
with him because she was "just tired of the pressure" and was fearful of losing her relationship
with him. Id.
158 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 140. Several parents called to request that their children not be assigned
to Stroud's class. Id.
I " Id. The school officials until this time had never called Jane Doe's parents to inform them
of their concerns. Id. When Jane Doe's parents were finally called, they were assured that a
meeting of all the concerned parties was to be held. Id. No such meeting ever took place. Id.
150 1d.
1(11 Id.
' 62 Id. at 141.
16 '/
 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 141.
164 1d. at 137.
1°5 Id. at 141. Even where the plaintiff in a § 1983 suit brought against supervisory officials,
states a legitimate constitutional violation, the supervisory officials themselves may escape liability
if they successfUlly plead that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. The officials "must show
that their conduct did 'not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.'" Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)), The school officials must demonstrate that "reasonable officials in their position at the
relevant time could have believed, in light of clearly established law, that their conduct comported
with established legal standards." Id. The 7itylor court concluded that no reasonable school official
would have believed that he could act with deliberate indifference towards instances of sexual
molestation by a school teacher, and, rejecting the qualified immunity defense, the court re-
manded the case to determine whether the school officials acted with the requisite deliberate
indifference. Id. at 148. The subject of qualified immunity is beyond the scope of this note.
166 Id. at 141. The denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable order. Id. (citing
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)).
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C. The Taylor Opinion
The Fifth Circuit's opinion, written by Judge Goldberg, began by
stating that the court "thought it was 'patently obvious' that the Con-
stitution would not tolerate the school officials looking the other way
or only taking meager measures to protect a fourteen-year-old girl from
being sexually abused by one of their subordinates." From this initial
premise, the court recognized that there were two major issues they
confronted in determining whether Superintendent Caplinger, Princi-
pal Lankford and the Taylor School District were liable for the sexual
assault of Jane Doe by one of their subordinates."' The first issue was
whether sexual molestation of a schoolchild rises to the level of a
constitutional violation, as a section 1983 suit requires."' The second
issue was whether the school officials owed Jane Doe some affirmative
duty to protect her from "such an assault on her constitutional
rights. "169
As to the first issue, no previous Fifth Circuit decision had held
that the sexual molestation of a child violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, although other circuits had addressed
the question.'" The Taylor court referred to its own precedent in
extending the due process prohibition to include the sexual molesta-
tion of a schoolchild by a teacher."' The Fifth Circuit had previously
held that a public school teacher violated the constitutional rights of
a schoolchild by lashing the child to a chair for a protracted period of
time without any justification. 172 As the Taylor court reasoned, if it was
unconstitutional for a teacher to tie a child to a chair, then it clearly
197 Taylor; 975 F.2d at 141.
168
 Id. See also D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1367 (3d
Cir. 1992) (Iglenerally, the first issue in a section 1983 case is whether a plaintiff sufficiently
alleges a deprivation of any right secured by the constitution").
169 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 141.
170 Id. at 143 ("We explicitly express this opinion for the first time in this circuit ... ."). See
also K.H. through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990) (sexual abuse of a child
removed by the state from natural home and placed in abusing home implicates due process);
Stoneking II, 882 F.2d 720, 727 (3d Cir. 1989) (due process clause protects student's right to be
free from sexual assault by teacher).
171 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 142. "We take no great leap in coming to this conclusion." Id.
172 See Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1987). The Supreme
Court had previously held that a state actor cannot use means, in the name of the public good,
which "shock the conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (where police
pumped suspect's stomach to retrieve evidence). Such conduct and methods implicate the due
process clause because they intrude upon an individual's liberty interest to be free from bodily
abuse. Id.
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had to be unconstitutional for a teacher to sexually molest a school-
child."
The Taylor court then turned to the more controversial aspect of
the case, whether the school officials involved owed Jane Doe an
affirmative obligation to protect her from the sexual molestation of
her teacher, their employee.'" The court concluded that the school
officials did owe Jane Doe an affirmative obligation to protect her
under two separate and distinctive theories.'" The court concluded
that from either theory, a duty did exist.'"
1. Supervisory Liability
The court first invoked the theory of supervisory liability to im-
pose a duty on the school officials to protect Jane Doe. 177 Superinten-
dent Caplinger and Principal Lankford could be held liable if, by their
direct actions, they were deliberately indifferent to the misconduct of
their subordinate.'"As the Stonekingiicourt had held, "school officials
can find themselves liable for the malfeasance of their subordinates if
they know or should be aware of the transgressions, yet consciously
choose not to put an end to them."'" Such conduct by the school
officials can only be viewed, so the court stated, as an implicit condo-
nation of the subordinate's constitutional indiscretion28° Most courts
believed that supervisory liability had survived the DeShaney cutback
on due process coverage."' Thus, because supervisory liability had
formed the basis for liability in other cases involving the sexual moles-
tation of a schoolchild by a public school teacher or other state actor,
the Taylor court imposed liability on that basis.'"
173 Thylor, 975 F.2d at 142-43. "Obviously, there is never any justification for sexually molest-
ing a child, and thus, no state interest which might support it." Id.
174 Id. at 144.
178 Id.
176 1d.
177 Id. at 144-45.
178 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 144-45. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text for a discussion
of supervisory liability.
173 Stoneking II, 882 F,2(1 720, 727 (3d Cir. 1989).
Taylor, 975 F.2d at 145. See also Slonehing II, 882 F.2d at 727.
181 See Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 725. "Nothing in DeShaney suggests that school officials may
escape liability arising from their policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions taken
by their subordinates." Id. The Supreme Court itself, in City of Canton v. Harris, affirmed this
concept of supervisory liability, as long as the offending actor was a state actor. 489 U.S. 378,
389-90 (1989).
182
 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 144-45. See Jane Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 901
F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990) (where bus driver sexually assaulted handicapped students); Stonek-
ing II, 882 F.2d at 725 (where band teacher sexually molested student); Waechter v. School Dist.
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2. Special Relationships
Despite the fact that the Taylor court was willing to decide the case
on the basis of supervisory liability, the court's opinion did not stop
there.'" The court went on to hold that the school officials could be
held liable for breaching their affirmative duty to protect Jane Doe
based on their "special relationship" with her, which arose when Jane
Doe entered the Taylor district school system.'" By virtue of Texas
statutory law, Jane Doe was compelled to attend public school and this
placed her in the care of the Taylor school district. 185
The Taylor court began its discussion of special relationships in
schools by invoking past circuit precedent.'" The Court cited with
approval its holdings in both Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School
District and in Lopez v. Houston Independent School District, which held
that because of compulsory attendance laws, the school officials had
entered into a special relationship with the students entrusted to their
care.' 87 The fact that these decisions may have actually been overruled
or at best altered, by the DeShaney decision was not mentioned.
The court then proceeded to discuss the DeShaney opinion, citing
that portion of the opinion providing that the special relationship
analysis is not applicable unless the state has affirmatively acted to
restrain individuals' freedom to act on their own behalf.'" The Fifth
Circuit had itself expounded upon the principles of DeShaney in its
Griffith v. Johnston decision, by adopting the rule that a duty to provide
protective services does not arise without the special relationship cre-
ated by the state's rendering individuals, against their will, helpless to
protect themselves. 1 e" The Taylor court concluded that by removing the
child from his or her parents, the state has assumed the obligation to
No. 14-030 of Casopolis, Mich., 773 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (where school
employee ordered student with asthma condition to run as punishment for talking in line);
Robert G. v. Newburgh Sch. Dist., 1990 WI.. 3210, at 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1990) (where student
sexually assaulted by substitute teacher); Tilson v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 1990 WL 98932,
at 8-9 (F.D. Pa. July 13, 1990) (where school employee sexually abused preschool students).
188 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 145.
1134 Id. at 144-45.
185 Id. at 144 (citing Ttcx. Enuc. Cone ANN. § 21.032).
186 Id.
' 87 See id. at 145-46; Lopez., 817 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1984); Horton, 690 E2d 470, 480 (5th
Cir. 1982). Sec supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of previous Fifth Circuit
precedent concerning special relationships.
188 Taylor, 975 E2d at 145 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, 109 S. CL 998, 1006
(1989)).
189 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th Cir. 1990).
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shoulder the burden of protecting the child from trauma, because the
child is "too young to be considered capable of mature restraint." 190
The Taylor court, after citing the instances where courts had found
special relationships to exist, extended the concepts outlined in
DeShaney and Griffith, by providing that the state acquires a duty to
protect an individual not only when it renders that individual helpless,
but also, when it renders the guardian of that individual powerless to
act on his or her own behalf. ' 9 ' Upon this premise, the Taylor court
held that "when the state has in some significant way separated the
child from the persons otherwise responsible for taking precautions to
shield the child from the social milieu, the state assumes a correspond-
ing duty to provide that protection .. • . "191 The Taylor court reasoned
that by compelling schoolchildren to attend school, the state affirma-
tively acted to restrain the ability of both Jane Doe and her parents to
provide for her welfare, and therefore, the state had entered into a
special relationship with Jane Doe and owed her an affirmative duty to
fill that void.' 93
The Taylor court recognized that its finding of a special relation-
ship conflicted with the majority of other circuits, citing in a footnote
the various cases of the other circuits that disagreed with its position.' 94
The court did find some case law to support its proposition, although
all but one of the cases were decided before the DeShaney decision. 195
190 Thylor, 975 F.2d at 145-46 (quoting Horton, 690 F.2(1. at 480).
19] Id.
190 hi.
193 k/. at 146-47. The Taylor court. reffised to define the precise contours of a school official's
duty, as it pertains to injuries inflicted by someone other than a school teacher. Id. at 146 n.14.
However, as will be discussed later, by holding as it did, the court had already partially answered
this question. DeShanty, 109 S. Ct. at 1006. See infra notes '259-69 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the scope of the duties created by special relationships.
194 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 147 11.13. See also Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 1992)
(compulsory school attendance law did not so restrain school child's liberty as to create special
relationship and affirmative duty to protect); DR. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 1992) (no special relationship because school officials do not
exercise the kind of physical custody and control contemplated by DeShaney); .J.O. v. Alton
Community Unit Sch. Dist., 909 E2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cit. 1990) (no affirmative duty to protect
since school does not render a child unable to care for basic human needs). DorothyJ. v. Little
Rock Sch. Dist., 794 l Supp. 1405, 1414 (E.D, Ark. 1992) (no special relationship in schools).
195 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 147. See, e.g. Stoneking I, 856 E2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1988) (students in
functional custody of state during school day); Lopez v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 351,
356 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirmative duty to protect student from harm inflicted by other student
because of special relationship); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th
Cir. 1982) (school officials have duty and special powers to protect children from anti-social
activities—their own and those of other students); Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F.Supp
641, 643 (E,D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that elementary school students, who were required by law to
attend school, were entitled to some affirmative protection from abuse by other students during
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The court then concluded that there was too much evidence that the
school officials knew of the wrongdoing of their subordinate and failed
to take prompt remedial action, to take the case from the jury, and
denied the motion for summary judgment.' 96 The school officials filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
which on January 19, 1993, was denied.' 97
VI. INTERPRETING THE TAYLOR DECISION
The Fifth Circuit, in Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, al-
though concluding that an affirmative obligation to protect students
existed in the schools because of the special relationship undertaken
between school officials and students, stated that its decision did not
necessarily mean that school officials could be liable for injuries inflicted
by other students.'" The court specifically declined to address this issue
and because the offending individual in the case was a school em-
ployee, and a state actor, the court did not have to address this ques-
tion.' 99 However, because of what it did do, the Taylor court has created
a schism in the judicial opinion among the federal courts.m At the
the school day). The decisions from the Third and Fifth Circuits would seem to have been
overruled. See Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1377; Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th Cir.
1990).
196 Thylor, 975 F.2d at 148-49.
117 Caplinger, Lankford v. Doe, 113 S. Gt. 1066 (Jan. 19, 1993) (No. 92-908). On the same
day, the Supreme Court also denied the petition for writ of cert. in the Middle Bucks case. 972
F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 1992 WL 347965 (Jan. 19, 1993) (No. 92-816).
" Taylor, 975 F.2d at 147.
199 Id. at 144-45, 147 n.14 ("The precise contours of a school official's duty, as it pertains to
injuries inflicted by someone other than a school teacher (or other state subordinate) is not
before us."). See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of supervisory
liability. The Stoneking- II court also confronted the special relationship issue but declined to issue
a ruling relying instead on supervisory liability. 882 F.2d 720, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1989). Perhaps the
Taylor court should have exercised the same caution.
2(6) See Taylor, 975 F.2d at 147 (finding special relationship in schools); but see Maldonado,
975 F.2d at 732 (finding no special relationship); Middle. Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1377 (same); Alton,
909 F.2d at 272 (same). Since the Taylor decision, the Third Circuit has upheld its reasoning of
the Middle Bucks case in a 1993 decision involving students sexually abused by their bus driver.
Black v, Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 1993 WL 17081 (3d Cir. 1993). In the Black case, supervisory
liability was not available as a means of imposing liability on the school district because the court
had determined that the bus driver was a private actor. Id. The bus driver worked for a private
contractor used by the school district. Id. The court went on to hold that the school district was
not liable for the injuries inflicted by private actors since no special relationship existed between
the students and their school district, affirming its holding in Middle Bucks. Id. See Middle Bucks,
972 F.2d at 1372. The Supreme Court has, by denying certiorari to the Taylor and Middle Bucks
cases, despite their contrary holdings, apparently left this dispute to be resolved at the appellate
level.
Two district court cases within the Third Circuit, however, have taken the affirmative obliga-
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very least, the decision will have profound consequences within the
Fifth Circuit.'"'
By declaring that schoolchildren are in a special relationship with
the state, when read in light of DeShaney and its progeny, the Fifth
Circuit has imposed similar obligations as are owed state institutional-
ized mental patients and prisoners. 2°2 Further, within the Fifth Circuit,
as well as other circuits, a finding of a special relationship carries with
it obligations to children in foster care or under state supervision, to
those in the "functional custody" of the state, and possibly to those
whom the state has placed in a position of danger.2°' In each of these
cases, the state becomes obligated to protect the individual against
tion to protect one step further than Middle Bucks. See K.L. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 828 F.
Supp. 1192, 1195-96 (E.D. Pa. 1993); C.M. v. Southeast. Delco Sch. Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1179, 1186
(E.D. Pa. 1993). In these decisions, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has held that states have
an affirmative obligation to protect students in public schools from abusive conduct by their
teachers. C.M., 828 F. Stipp. at 1186. However, this affirmative duty does not extend to protecting
students from other school employees and state actors. K.L., 828 F. Supp. at 1196,
201 The court's decision may in filet already conflict with previous Fifth Circuit precedent. In
Griffith v. Johnston, the circuit had already held that a special relationship existed between the
state and one of its citizens only where the state has acted to curtail the individual's ability, against
his or her will, to protect his or her self. 899 F.2d at 1439. It seems unlikely that even the Taylor
court would acknowledge that students are in school "against their will." See Taylor, 975 F.2d at
147 ("we too would not equate 'a schoolyard to a prison'"). The Fifth Circuit has since cited its
holding in Thy/or in a case involving a § 1983 suit brought by the estate of a hostage killed by a
gunman during a confrontation where the local sheriff called off a city police team of hostage
negotiators and replaced them with county personnel. Salas v, Carpenter, 980 F,2d 308, 311 (5th
Cir. 1992). The Saks court held that due process violations sufficient to support a § 1983 action
can be found if "uncommon circumstances" create a special relationship and duty for the state
to provide protective services to a particular individual. Id. Although the Taylor court may have
been unwilling to define the "precise contours" of the state's duty, the Fifth Circuit has seized on
the Taylor decision and defined such a duty to mean that the state owes persons in "uncommon
circumstances," a duty to protect them from harm from third persons (the gunman in Salas) and
to provide certain services that they are unable to provide for themselves. Id.
002 See Youngberg v, Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) ("[w] hen a person is institutionalized
and wholly dependent on the state, a duty to provide certain services and care does exist"); Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976) (prison officials have affirmative duty to provide necessary
services and to protect prisoners and detainees from injuries).
2°3 See Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dept. of Human Scrv., 959 F.2d 883, 890 (10th Cir. 1992)
(special relationship exists when a state social services agency removes a child from natural home
and places him in a state•run foster care facility); K.tl. through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846,
851 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1439 (children in state custody are in a special
relationship with the state); Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that
state owed affirmative obligation to protect where police instruction to burglary suspect to remain
in private club, despite danger from owner, constituted functional state custody); Doe v, New York
City DSS, 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981) (special relationship exists in foster care situation);
C-69 v. Degnan, 745 F. Stipp. 254, 265 (D.NJ. 1990) (court held that a special relationship existed
where the state had acted affirmatively to place plaintiff in position of danger, as government
informant, where otherwise the individual would not have been).
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harm from both state as well as private actors:204 Additionally, the state
may be held liable for failing, under sufficiently culpable circum-
stances, to provide protective services and ensure the general welfare
and safety of the students entrusted to its care. 2°5 Equating special
relationships and the necessary obligations attached to them to the
nation's public schools has two flaws, one from a doctrinal legal per-
spective and another from a practical standpoint.
A. Special Relationships are Legally Inapplicable to Schools
I. Schoolchildren Are Not Prisoners
The Supreme Court, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, at-
tempted to create a bright-line test for determining when an affirma-
tive obligation to protect arises through the state's undertaking of a
special relationship with an individual. 206 Only where the state has
affirmatively acted to restrain an individual's freedom to act on his or
her own behalf through incarceration, institutionalization or other
similar restraint of personal liberty does the state enter into a special
relationship with that individual. 207 The "analogy of a schoolyard to a
prison may be a popular one for school-age children," but school
officials do not exercise the full severe and continuous restrictions of
liberty as exist in prisons and state mental hospitals that DeShaney
indicated was necessary for a special relationship to exist. 208
In the contexts of prisons and mental hospitals, the state has taken
custody of individuals and rendered them unable to provide for their
basic human needs, like food, shelter, clothing, medical care and
reasonable safety."° It is this state custody that, for many courts, is the
201 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005 (1989). "When the State
takes a person into custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon
it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." Id.
205 See id. at 1005-06.
When the State, by its affirmative exercise of its power, so restrains an individual's
liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to
provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Due
Process Clause.
Id.
206 Id.
2°7 Id. at 1006.
2°810. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990). See also
DeShaney, 109 S. Gt. at 1005-06; Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372.
209 See DeShaney, 109 S. CL at 1005-06.
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deciding factor as to whether a special relationship exists. 21 " Without
the state's protective grip, the individual would be completely defense-
less and incapable of protecting his or her own liberty interests. 2 "
Because it is the state that has acted to create such a result, it is the
state that must ensure their constitutional safety because nothing short
satisfies Due Process and the Constitution. 212
Although public school students are compelled by law to attend
school, it can hardly be said that this fact alone constitutes the kind of
affirmative act by the state of taking an individual into custody that
DeShaney contemplated.m Schoolchildren, by statute, are required to
attend school for only 180, six-hour days per year.214 Further, school-
children remain residents of their homes and are free to leave school
after school hours. 215 Unlike the custodial relationships that exist in the
contexts of prisons and mental hospitals, schoolchildren have not
become wards of the state, subject to continuous and full-time severe
state restriction of liberty. 215
210 See Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987, 990-91 (1st Cir. 1992) (where
court held that no special relationship existed where the state did not affirmatively act to take
the individual into custody, where the individual was voluntarily on his way to a mental health
fficility); Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1067 (3d Cir. 1991) (no duty to protect
persons who arc not in custody of the state from violent acts of persons who are not state officials);
Harris v. District of Columbia, 932 F.2d 10, 13-4 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (no special relationship where
individual nut in custody of the State; no custody existed where officers shackled victim's ankles,
handcuffed him, and locked him in police van); Alton, 909 F.2d at 272-73 ("the state's custody
over the person is the most distinguishing characteristic" in special relationships, and school
children are not like prisoners and mental patients); Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1439 (no special
relationship exists where the state no longer had custody of children placed in adopted homes);
Was v. Young, 796 F. Supp. 1041, 1045-47 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (spectators beaten by other attendees
at fireworks display not in special relationship with State and no affirmative obligation to protect
because not in State custody); Flynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(no special relationship existed between slate and woman murdered by ex-boyfriend during lapse
period of police protection). One commentator has suggested that the Supreme Court's decision
in DeShaney rejected the positions that a non-custodial "special relationship" may give rise to a
duty of the state to act, the breach of which would lead to § 1983 liability and that a "special
relationship" did not depend upon custody. See Douthett, The Death of Constitutional Duty: The
Court Reacts to the Expansion of Section 1983 Liability in DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, 52
OHIO ST. 1_,J. 643, 647 (1991).
2 " DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
2121d,
215 See id. (special relationships created through incarceration, institutionalization, or other
similarrestraint of personal liberty) (emphasis added); Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371-72 (stating
that DeShaney sets out a test of physical custody for special relationships and that such custody
does not exist in schools); Alton, 909 F.2d at 272 (stating that the state's custody is the most
distinguishing characteristic of mental patients and prisoners and that schoolchildren are not in
custody).
214 See Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372.
215 /d.
216 1d. at 1371-72.
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One commentator has suggested that "[al proper analysis should
look to the implications of custodial control, rather than only to the
control itself, because it is the underlying dependency that actually
obligates the state to act, not the state's legal status as custodian."'"
Even if this is the proper interpretation to be given to the "legal"
creation of special relationships under DeShaney, it seems equally clear
that when examined closely, the state has not so restricted the liberty
interests of students forced to attend public school as to completely
deprive those students of the ability to provide for their own basic
human needs. 2 ' 8 Thus, even under a non-custodial analysis, the state
has not become so intertwined with one of its citizens' lives, that it has
assumed responsibility for ensuring that citizen's welfare and protec-
tion."'
As has been noted in the past, schoolchildren and prisoners stand
in wholly different circumstances, as incarceration deprives prisoners
of, "the freedom to be with family and friends and to form the other
enduring attachments of normal life."220 In contrast, this is not the case
with regard to students compelled by law to attend public school. 22'
The schoolchild is not left completely defenseless while at school,
completely shut off from the outside world. 222 As the Supreme Court
stated:
Though attendance may not always be voluntary, the public
school remains an open institution .. . . The child is not
physically restrained from leaving school during school
hours; and at the end of the school day, the child is invariably
free to return home. Even while at school, the child brings
with him the support of family and friends, and is rarely apart
from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest
any instances of mistreatment. 223
2 L 7 See Huefner, supra note 19, at 1957.
218 Courts have disagreed on the necessity of having actual physical custody to invoke the
special relationship affirmative protection analysis. See, e.g., Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371
(physical custody required). But see Stoneking II, 882 F.2d 720, 724 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that
custodial relationship possibly existed in schools but refusing to apply special relationship analysis
because offending actor was state actor). See supra notes 210-13 for other cases.
219 Alton, 909 F.2d at 272.
22° Ingrahm v. Wright., 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977).
221 See Alton, 909 F.2d at 272 ("the government, acting through local school administrators,
has not rendered its schoolchildren so helpless that an affirmative constitutional duty to protect
arises") .
14 Id.
223 higraitM, 430 U.S. at 670 (Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual
treatment were inapplicable to schools and corporal punishment). This quote has been cited
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Additionally, compulsory school attendance laws do not prevent
students from seeking outside help. 224 Further, the state has not as-
sumed responsibility for the child's entire personal life, as it has when
it imprisons or institutionalizes a citizen. 225 In sum, while school
officials have been judicially and statutorily granted much control over
their students' lives, they do not exercise the kind or degree of control
that DeShaney contemplated. 2"
2. Parents, Not the State, Owe the Child Primary Care Duties
The Fifth Circuit, in Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, ex-
tended the concept of state assumption of affirmative obligations, to
include those instances where the state has also rendered the guardian
of the individual powerless to act on his or her behalf. 227 The Taylor
court provided, without citing precedent, that when the state has in
some significant way separated the child from the persons otherwise
responsible for taking care of the child, the state assumes that very
duty. 228 Yet it seems inapposite to declare that by requiring children to
attend public school, the state has so deprived the parents, the child's
primary caretakers, from providing for the child's basic needs and
protection, that the state is obligated to fill that vacuum. Under the
laws of many states, it is the parents who decide whether to educate
the child at home, in private or in public schools.229 Additionally, even
when enrolled in public school, parents retain the discretion to remove
a child from classes for religious instruction, non-school sponsored
educational trips and tours, and for health care reasons. 2" In the case
of special education students, the parents must approve the educa-
tional programs and even while in school, parents remain the primary
decision-makers for the child."'
with approval by other courts, who have used it to reject the special relationship duty in the
schools. See Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at. 1373 (calling their view of the public school function with
respect to its students "in harmony" with the Supreme Court).
224 Allen, 909 F.2d at 272.
225 Id.
226 Id. See also New jersey v. TLO, 409 U.S. 325,339-40 (1984). In holding that school officials
do not need a warrant or probable cause to conduct a search of a student, the Court recognized
that maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school
disciplinary procedures and closer supervision than would be allowed in the adult world. Id.
227 Doc v. Taylor indep, Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137,146 (5th Cir. 1992).
228 „rd.
229 Middle Bucks, 972 F.2(1 at 1371,
2" Id.
231 Id.
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Not only has the state not adversely affected the parents' ability
to perform their primary caretaker responsibilities while their children
are in school, but the state, by both statute and judicial precedent, lacks
the power to fill that void.'" By statute, state school officials are allowed
to develop only those reasonable regulations necessary to governing
student conduct.'" School officials are vested with only such control
and authority as is reasonably necessary to prevent infractions of dis-
cipline and interference with the educational process. 234 Finally, teach-
ers are not among those persons responsible for a child's welfare under
typical statutes designed to provide child protective services."'
3. The Legal Status of Children
The Supreme Court has, in a number of decisions since the late
1960s, altered the "legal status" of children under the Constitution."'
These decisions indicate that children possess significant rights under
the Constitution and that when these children enter the "schoolhouse
gate," they do not shed these constitutional rights. 237 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has dramatically changed the status of those school
officials charged with the duty of operating the nation's schools. 23"
These changes significantly deprive the special relationship argument
in the school context of much of its force, because DeShaney indicates
that what causes a special relationship to arise is a state-dominated
environment where the individuals confined within have been totally
deprived of their liberty interests."' Under the Supreme Court's own
jurisprudence, such an environment does not exist in modern
schools."'
One of the justifications used for claiming that a special relation-
ship exists in schools is that teachers and school officials act in loco
parentis in their dealings with students: their authority is that of the
parent and not of the state. 24 ' The Supreme Court has since rejected
252 1d. at 1372.
233 Id.
234 Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372.
233 Id. at 1371-72.
2' See, e.g., New Jersey v. TLO., 469 U.S. 326, 336 (1984); Ingrahm v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
662 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
237 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.
238 Ingrahrn, 430 U.S. at 662; TLO, 469 U.S. at 336.
23° DeShaney v. Winnebago County BSS, 109 S. CL 998, 1006 (1989).
24° See, e.g., Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372; TO. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist, 909 F.2d
267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990).
241 See Huefner, supra note 19, at 1967.
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this doctrine, arguing that today's public school officials do not merely
exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by parents, but rather,
they act in furtherance of publicly-mandated educational and discipli-
nary policies.242
 As a result, the Supreme Court has held that school
officials are subject to the commands and restrictions of the First and
Fourth Amendments, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and possibly the Fifth Amendment. 243
This rejection of the in loco parentis doctrine has a tremendous
detrimental effect on the major tenet of the special relationship argu-
ment which provides that by removing the child from his or her home,
the state has assumed the role and obligations of the parent in ensur-
ing the safety and welfare of the child. 214
 The Supreme Court has
recognized that school officials are ill-suited for the in loco parentis task
because they are compelled to act in the best interests of the state, a
goal often mutually exclusive and even at odds with the interests of
individual students. 245 As one commentator stated, "Evil hen the school
official takes a child in hand, searches him, and turns him over to the
police, the school official acts as a representative of government and
not as a representative of the parent." 246 Given the school official's
continual responsibility and status as a state actor, school officials can
242 710, 469 U.S. at 336.
293 Id. (school officials, in carrying out searches and seizures and other disciplinary functions,
cannot claim parents' immunity from the provisions of the Fourth Amendment); Goss, 419 U.S.
at 573 (prior to suspensions from school, students are entitled to some limited due process
protection); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505 (as school officials do not possess absolute authority over
students they may not suppress freedom of expression if such expression does not interfere with
school discipline); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (1t)he
Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizen against the state itself and all of its creatures-Boards
of Education not excepted; Boards of Education have important, delicate and highly discretionary
functions, but none that they may not perform within the Bill of Rights"), Sec supra note 70 for
a discussion of the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to schools.
244 Taylor, 975 F.2d at 146.
245 AS one commentator has suggested:
[p]arents retain unrestrained authority ... [over their children] because we assume
that the natural love and concern for their offspring will provide its own limits.
School officials, however, have less emotional ties to their students ... and may be
unable to exercise their disciplinary functions solely in the best interests of the
individual child.
Stuart C. Berman, Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope of the T1,0 School-Search
Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1077, 1116 (1991).
Another author has suggested that "[i]t is questionable whether the in loco parentis doctrine
has any role to play today . . . [p]ublic school officials are agents of the government and
frequently fail to display the protective concern for a child which is an expected characteristic of
a parent." ARVAL A. IvtoRttis, Tite CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION 277 (1989).
246 ,rd.
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hardly be deemed the equivalent of parents. 247 As one commentator
has written:
Parents possess certain privileges with regard to the treatment
of their children, under the assumption that they will act with
the love, emotional concern, and special interest implicit in
the parent-child relationship. In so acting, parents engage in
activities which further their children's welfare, not the least
of which is an attempt to shelter their children from harm.
This protective quality which is inherent in an in loco parentis
relationship is nonexistent in the school environment. School
administrators are not employed to serve the interest of indi-
vidual children. Rather, their objective is the fulfillment of a
duty to coordinate school operations and to maintain an
educational environment—in short to promote the welfare of
all students . . . the decisions parents make with regard to
their children are plainly different from those made by school
officials.248
In sum, although those advocating special relationship application
to schools would continue to regard school officials as surrogate par-
ents of students, the Supreme Court has destroyed any validity to this
argument by rejecting it in the context of school disciplinary proce-
dures.249 Conversely, what authority has been taken away from the
school officials has been given, in the form of constitutional liberty
rights, to students. To that effect, students are entitled to freedom of
expression while in schoo1.25° Further, students are to be protected
247 See Deborah A. Reperowitz, Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-School Officials May
Conduct Student Searches Upon Satisfaction of Reasonableness Test In Order to Maintain Educational
Environment: In re TLO, 14 SgroN HALL. L. REV. 738, 756-57 (1984) ("[al parental authority
analogy as applied to schools is now obsolete . . . . Because the relationships which parents and
administrators have with children under their care are manifestly different, administrators should
not be granted the same privileges parents have with regard to their own children.").
248 Id. at 757.
249 TLO, 469 U.S. at 336-37. "Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco parentis
in their dealings with students . . . and is therefore not subject to the limits of the Fourth
Amendment. Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of this
Court." Id. at 336. Even in denying students constitutional protections, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the concept of parental delegation as a source of school authority is not in line
with modern schools and thus is not to be used to justify school disciplinary procedures. lngrahm
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977). In Ingrahtn, the Supreme Court determined that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual treatment does not apply to corporal punishment
to schools. Id. In so doing, the Court refused to base the exception on the concept of parental
delegation but rather that the open environment of the classroom did not require such protection
normally reserved for prisoners. Id
250 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.
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from unreasonable searches and seizures, and in some school circum-
stances may have the same Fourth Amendment rights as adults. 251
Finally, students are entitled to procedural safeguards that minimize
the risk of wrongful punishment in the name of school discipline and
may be entitled to the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-in-
crimination. 252
 Even in denying Eighth Amendment applicability to
corporal punishment in schools, the Supreme Court in effect emanci-
pated students by contrasting them with prisoners and declaring that
for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment, students need little pro-
tection because the school is an open institution where students are
not to be considered in custody of the state. 253
If students are not in the custody of the state while attending
public school for purposes of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Eighth
Amendments to the Constitution, it is inconceivable how they can be
for another part of the Constitution. 254 DeShaney stands for the propo-
sition that when the state has affirmatively acted to deprive a citizen of
his or her constitutionally-protected liberty interests, the Constitution
demands that the state fill the void left by its own action. 255
 Because
the Supreme Court has found that students have not been deprived of
their basic constitutional liberty interests while in school, the first part
of the special relationship analysis fails: the state has not affirmatively
251
 7W, 469 U.S. at 339. Students, while in school, have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in a variety of legitimate, non-contraband and thus before a search may take place, school officials
must have a reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law or school rules. Id. One commentator
has suggested that this TLO reasonable suspicion standard was intended to be limited only to
searches conducted on school grounds and of personal belongings and effects. Berman, supra
note 246, at 1096-97. Under this analysis, the standard for searching lockers and other items
might be the identical standard to he used in the adult world, where a warrant and/or probable
cause is required, Id. If it is asserted that students have the same Fourth Amendment rights as
the adult population, this strengthens the argument that children are not in custody of the State.
The Supreme Court has already determined that prisoners, obviously in the custody of the State,
have no reasonable expectation of privacy. 710, 469 U.S. at 338.
252 ingrahM, 430 U.S. at 669 (punishment of schoolchildren that is excessive violates Consti-
tution); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (striking down Ohio law providing for suspensions
of up to ten days without any written procedure applicable to suspensions). See supra note 70
for a discussion of the Fifth Amendment's applicability to schools.
253 Ingrahm, 430 U.S. at 669 ("the prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different
circumstances, separated by harsh lItcts of criminal conviction and incarceration"); TLO, 469 U.S.
at 338 (prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in cells and court not yet ready to
hold that schools and prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
254 See 7'LO, 469 U.S. at 336; Ingrahni, 430 U.S. at 662; Gams, 419 U.S. at 573; Tinker, 393 U.S.
at 505.
255
 DeShaney v, Winnebago County DSS, 109 S. CL 998,1006 (1989). When the State by the
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to
care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs, it transgresses
the Due Process Clause." Id. at 1005-06.
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acted to suppress students' constitutional rights. 256 DeShaney clearly
dictates that, in this situation, the state has not assumed an obligation
to fill a void that it has not created, and that, in fact, does not exist. 257
B. Impracticability of Special Relationships to Schools
Not only is it difficult to justify the existence of special relation-
ships because of the lack of coercion exercised by the state in schools
on a "legal basis," but it is also difficult to justify imposing affirmative
duties on school officials on a "practical basis." Must the state, through
its school officials, ensure the safety of school-children from injuries
inflicted by other students, from injuries as a result of typical childhood
accidents, and from injuries as a result of extracurricular activities,
such as school sports? Is the state required to protect the child after
school hours and on off-school grounds? Perhaps more significantly,
must the state provide the kind of necessary services that are required
for others involved in special relationships with the state, like prisoners
and mental patients, such as food, clothing, shelter and medical care,
where the parents fail to provide these essentials? 258 The DeShaney
opinion may have already answered this final question in the affirma-
tive. 259 In DeShaney, the Court determined that where the State has
deprived an individual of the ability to take care of himself or herself,
the state must fill the void, otherwise the Constitution is not satisfied. 266
If the state has rendered this result by requiring public school students
to attend, then the state is required to fulfill its obligations. 261
256 Id.
257 Id. at 1003. "It (the Due Process Clause) forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of
life, liberty, or property without 'due process of law', but its language cannot be fairly extended
to impose an affirmative obligation to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through
other means." Id.
258 This is precisely the question asked by the court in a recent lower court decision which
rejected the application of special relationships to schools. Dorothy j. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist.,
794 F, Supp. 1405, 1414 (E.D. Ark. 1992). One commentator has already answered the question
affirmatively and raised the possibility that the State owes a child (that it has entered into a special
relationship with) affirmative obligations to provide substantive rights beyond "mere" protection
from physical harm. Amy Sinden, In Search of Affirmative Duties Toward Children Under a Post-
DeShaney Constitution, 139 U. PENN. L. RI:v. 227, 263 (1990). These would include protection
from emotional harm, duty to assist in exercise of fundamental constitutional rights, like family
integrity and association, and duties to provide housing, daycare, and drug treatments. Id.
259
 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005.
216 Id. See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) ("When a person is institutionalized
and wholly dependent on the State, a duty to provide certain services and care does exist"); Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (where the state has imprisoned an individual, it owes that
individual a duty to provide adequate medical care and to ensure his safety).
261 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005.
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Even the Fifth Circuit, in Doe v. Taylor Independent School District,
refused to define what the scope of such an affirmative duty might
be . 262
 Enforcing affirmative obligations to protect students from harm
and mischief, no matter what the source, would "expand constitutional
duties of care to millions of schoolchildren."265 School officials would
be subject to § 1983 liability anytime a child skinned his knee on the
playground or was beat-up by the school bully, so long as the school
officials were not constantly attentive to the needs of every student
entrusted to their care. 2" School officials would be constitutionally
obligated to assume the roles of police-officers or even prison guards
to ensure the safety of every student in today's more dangerous
schools. 21 i5 In addition, "school officials who are too restrictive would
likely be charged under the same Due Process Clause with violating
student's [sic] rights not to be treated like incarcerated prisoners,"
rights that the Supreme Court has only within the last twenty-five years
proclaimed. 26" Further, much of the change in the legal status of chil-
dren was rendered by the growing violence in today's schools, violence
that altered the status of school officials to "quasi-police officers" rather
than teachers.2" Finally, the change in the environment of schools
themselves has made it unrealistic and nearly impossible to require and
to expect that school officials can be responsive to all student needs
and threats. 2"8
 With schools already terribly overburdened, imposing
'26 7i.tylor, 975 F.2d at 147.
263 Dorothy J., 794 F. Stipp. at 1414,
264 Id.
266 Id.
266 1d. This paradox was also identified by the Supreme Court in DeShartey, that if the State
had acted too quickly and too aggressively in removing Joshua from Isis home, the same social
services agency would be the target of the same Due Process liability, brought, this time, by the
offended father. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007.
267 See Jules Menacker, Getting Tough on Sehoot
-Connected Crime in Illinois, 51 Um, L. REP.
347, 347 (1989).
The problems of school-related juvenile violence . . . has reached a national crisis
level. For over two decades, the annual Gallup Poll of the public's attitudes toward
public schools has ranked discipline and drug abuse as the major problems con-
fronting schools. The National Crime Survey reported that in 1986 nearly three
million incidents of assault, rape, robbery and theft took place in schools or on
school property.
Id. See also New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 338-39 (1984). Its TLO, the Supreme Court
recognized that violence in schools and the need to maintain a proper educational environment
required lesser constitutional protections than granted to adults in the outside world. Id. However,
previously, students barely had any rights at all, so that the Court's lower standard for student
searches was actually accompanied by a large grant of constitutional rights to the same students.
Id.
268 See Reperowite, supra note 248, at 756.
Today, ... teachers specialize in particular areas, mandatory school attendance has
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more constitutional duties and liability for failure to fulfill impossible
obligations will exacerbate an already desperate situation.
As the DeShaney Court declared, "U] udges and lawyers, like other
humans, are moved by a natural sympathy . . . to find a way for [plain-
tiffs] to receive adequate compensation for grievous harm inflicted
upon them." 2 G9 Nevertheless, the Due Process Clause cannot be judi-
cially expanded to provide a remedy for every injustice wrought by
other human beings. 27° Changing state tort law appears to be the more
attractive alternative to court expansion of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Perhaps an alternative standard could be adopted, such as that
identified by a dissenting opinion in DR v. Middle Bucks Area Voca-
tional Technical School. 27 ' In this dissent, it was suggested that rather
than adopt a bright-line standard, as with special relationships, courts
should use a fact-specific analysis to determine whether an affirmative
duty should exist with respect to particular individuals and particular
circumstances. 272 Unfortunately, although this standard might provide
a remedy in more grievous circumstances, like Joshua DeShaney's, the
uncertainty and unpredictability of such a standard would leave school
officials, as well as courts, grasping, without any guidelines to govern
their conduct.
VII. CONCLUSION
Not every tort committed by a state actor can be remedied by the
Constitution. To impose constitutional duties on school officials, the
likes of which exist only in prisons and mental hospitals, would over-
burden, both legally and practicably, the special relationship analysis
outlined by the DeShaney Supreme Court. School officials would be
forced to ensure the protection of students from teachers, other em-
ployees, other students, and even from their own youthful antics.
School officials, already overburdened, would be forced to provide the
kind of services reserved for only those in full-time custody of the state
led to larger classes, and students may spend only a few hours per week with each
teacher. Consequently, the school has become an impersonal environment wherein
teachers rarely become acquainted with students on an individual basis .... It is
therefore illogical to expect school officials to treat students with the same under-
standing and concern as the youngsters' parents.
Id.
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007.
270 Id.
271 972 F.2d 1364, 1384 (3d Cir. 1992) (Becker, j., dissenting).
272 1d. (Becker, j., dissenting).
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to students who spend only half the year and one-quarter of the day
in the classroom.
In its search for a bright-line standard to determine when, if ever,
the state owes a citizen an affirmative duty to protect, the Supreme
Court had created a conflict that, until recently, appeared to be resolv-
ing itself. The Fifth Circuit, however, has thrown new logs onto the fire,
and it appears likely that the conflict will grow more heated. Addition-
ally, by refusing to hear the Doe and Middle Bucks cases, the Supreme
Court has apparently given its assurance that it intends to allow the
fire to continue burning.
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